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D. A. DOBBINS AND BERNARD M. BASS
ment and population. The first-order partial
correlation obtained was .70 between unemploy-
ment and prison admissions holding the effects of
population growth constant. The original coef-
ficient of .78 between unemployment and prison
admissions was thus reduced only slightly by
holding state population constant. When popula-
tion and unemployment were optimally weighted
and combined to predict prison admissions, a
multiple correlation of .86 was found between
admissions and the combined predictors, suggest-
ing that both population and unemployment data
are useful in the forecasting of penitentiary admis-
sions. The multiple R accounts for 74 percent
of the variance in prison admissions, more than
either of the variables considered alone. If white
admissions are considered separately, the above
relationships increase slightly; if Negro admissions
are considered alone, the relationships are reduced
drastically.
CONCLUSIONS
Three factors may be considered in accounting
for the differential effects of unemployment on
Negro and white prison commitments. These
emphasize both cultural and psychological as well
as the economic aspects of unemployment:
1. One reason for the lower association found
between unemployment and Negro prison admis-
sions may be the tendency of Negroes to commit
relatively more crimes against the person than
whites (7). Over the 14-year period, 5 to 16 per-
cent more Negroes were committed for crimes
against the person than whites, while whites were
committed from 9 to 10 percent more for property
crimes than Negroes. Direct economic gain played
a relatively smaller role in the crimes committed
by Negroes.
2. The median income for Louisiana white
males in 1949 was $2,228 and $997 for colored
males (10). The state unemployment compensa-
tion rates ranged from $100 to $500 yearly. It is
apparent that compensation received from the
state employment security program more nearly
approximates the wage the Negro would normally
receive from productive labor. This is not the
case for the white who, upon losing a job, suffers
relatively more economic deprivation than the
chronically low income Negro. The white, there-
fore, might be more likely to resort to criminal
means in order to reestablish his income.
3. Considered from a psychological viewpoint,
unemployment may be more critical for the white
than the Negro in that it is more damaging to the
white male's self-esteem. For the Negro, much
more frequently a "marginal" worker, unemploy-
ment is more expected and probably does not
have the degrading status it has among whites.
(Surveys indicate that the unemployed have the
lowest status among all occupational groups
rated (2, 4). A variety of raters, including both
graduate students and laborers, ranked the un-
employed beneath 26 occupations in relative
prestige. The unemployed were ranked below such
low-level occupations as janitors, farm laborers,
and coal miners.) The differential effects of un-
employment on Negro and white criminal behavior
may be psychological manifestations of differing
cultural values placed on holding a "steady job."
The results of the many studies which have
investigated the relationship between crime and
the various social accompaniments of economic
distress have well illustrated that one can look
for no single source of motivation in criminal
behavior. These studies point to an entire complex
of potentially contributing conditions which
comprise the environment of people in need.
Certainly, the great number of violators for crimes
such as narcotics offenses, rape, murder, and
assault stands as testimony to the fact that
criminals are not motivated solely by economic
need.
Unemployment may both directly and in-
directly lead to crime. However, crime must be
viewed as an individual phenomenon. The majority
of unemployed people do not commit crimes.
Probably, no economic event can properly be
considered a cause of crime; more likely, it is the
particular individual's ability to adjust psycho-
logically to a frustrating economic situation which
ultimately determines whether he will violate the
legal code. This study reinforces the need for
considering unemployment as a relevant variable
in crime etiology. However, it should be con-
sidered as only one variable which must be related
to many others in the framework of a single
theory of criminal behavior.
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LEGAL METHODS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ORGANIZED CRIME
II. The Investigative Function of the Prosecuting Attorney
MARVIN E. ASPEN
Television and radio have stereotyped the prose-
cutor as a "combination of Sherlock Holmes, Dick
Tracy, J. Edgar Hoover, and Sir Galahad. He
solves the cases himself, assisted only by a beauti-
ful secretary. Together they break down doors,
track the culprits to their lair, solve the murder
that has been committed and prevent three or
four more additional homicides. All the defendants
are then brought to an untimely death by the
deadly workmanship of the District Attorney, who
thus obviates the necessity for evidence, makes a
trial unnecessary and permits the entire case to
be solved in exactly 28 minutes, thus leaving time
for the commercial on the merits of a deodorant."'
In reality, however, the prosecutor is primarily a
lawyer who ordinarily enters into the case only
after the culprit has been apprehended. The pri-
mary obligation to detect and suppress crime rests
with the police authorities of the community.'
1 McDonald, Problems of a Prosecutor, 24 N.Y.S.B.
BuLL. 221 (1952).
2 See e.g., ILL. Rxv. STAT. c 125, §§17, 18 (1953)
(Sheriff's duty) Cook County, Illinois serves as an
example of a community of many police authorities;
MuNcIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, §§11-24 to 33 (1939)
(Powers and Duties of Municipal Police Force). In
addition, Chicago police have the duty to prevent, as
well as to detect, violations of the gambling law. ID.
at S 191-6 (1939). It appears that members of the
Chicago Park District police force have even wider
powers to apprehend violators. Park District Police
are authorized to enforce both the Park District Code
and the city code. CHICAGO PARK DIsTRIcT CODE
8-55 (1940). For a more extensive treatment of police
However, when these authorities fail to perform
their duties, the obligation must be assumed by
other public officials. As a practical matter, this
duty often devolves upon the local prosecutor.3
The failure of the prosecuting attorney to assume
this duty may result in continued corrupt and un-
lawful conditions in the community. 4
The power to investigate is the prosecuting
attorney's chief weapon against that crime which
is tolerated by the police.' However, state officials,
lawyers, and laymen as well, often misunderstand
the scope of the prosecutor's authority and the
extent of his duty to conduct investigations.'
powers and duties, see, SMTHm, POlCE SYsTExsS IN THE
UNITED STATES 109 (2d. ed. 1949); WLsoN, POLIcE
ADmINISTRATION 115 (1950). See also, Petersen, Issues
and Problems in Metropolitan Area Police Seroices,
48 J. CRlm. L., C. & P.S. 127 (1957); I ORGANIZED
CnR= AND LAw ENFORCEMENT 190 (1952).
3 Although throughout this paper the state prosecutor
will be referred to as the prosecuting attorney or prose-
cutor, a variety of titles are used for his office in the
various states, i.e., district attorney (New York),
commonwealth's attorney (Kentucky), circuit attorney
(Missouri), states attorney (Illinois), county prosecutor
(New Jersey), county attorney (Mississippi), solicitor
(Alabama), prosecutor (Montana), and prosecuting
attorney (Michigan,.
4 See 76 A. B. A. REP. 385, 401 (1951).
' The American Bar Association's 1951 report
maintained that the prosecuting attorney has wide
powers to combat crime and that equipped with an
adequate investigative staff and the technical ability,
as well as the will to enforce the laws, he can do much
to control crime in his community. Id. at 401.
6See note 1, supra.
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There are three principal types of investigations
which the prosecutor might employ. First, he might
initiate investigations prior to the arrest of an
accused, although, as previously stated, this func-
tion is usually that of the local police. Second, he
might investigate after arrest and indictment in
order to gather additional evidence necessary for
the prosecution of the case. Third, the prosecutor
might investigate solely to determine whether the
police are conscientiously performing their duties.
As to the second type there is apparently little
question but that a prosecutor may investigate to
secure evidence for the prosecution of an accused
under indictment! This type of investigation is
regarded as corrollary to his duty to prosecute.
However, there is disagreement among authorities
as to whether the prosecuting attorney possesses
general police powers allowing him to investigate
for the purpose of prosecuting law violations, and
as to the right of a prosecutor to investigate the
police.8 To determine these issues respecting the
investigative powers of the prosecutor requires an
examination of the duties imposed upon him by
his state constitution or legislature.
THE PROSECUTOR'S STATUTORY DUTY
TO INVESTIGATE
Constitutional or statutory provisions in every
state enumerate the duties of the prosecuting
attorney. Although the language of these statutes
require him to prosecute all defendants indicted
of crime, they are silent as to his duty to investi-
gate.9 However, even though the statutory lan-
guage which creates the office and duties of the
prosecuting attorney does not assign him any pre-
cise investigative duty, certain other statutes
charge him with the investigation of particular
-See, e.g., DeLong & Baker, The Prosecuting At-
tontey, 24 J. CRan. L. & C. 1025, 1046 (1934); I OR-
GANIZED CRT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 246 (1952).8 In regard to the scope of the police investigatory
duty, see note 2, supra. Some authorities want the
prosecuting attorney's office completely divorced from
criminal investigation. See, e.g., HARRISON, POLICE
ADMINISTRATION IN BosToN 132 (1934). Other experts
feel that the -prosecutor should be the primary in-
vestigatory officer in the community. See e.g.,
W1LLOUdGiBY, PImciPEs OF JuDIciAL ADmINISTRA-
TION 139 (1929). Professor Ploscowe asserts that the
prosecuting attorney's function is to investigate as
well as to prosecute. I ORGANIZED CRaME AND LAW
EN-ORCEMENT 262 (1952).
9See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 14, 5 (1951); MAss.
AN-. LAWS. c. 12, 27 (1952); N.Y. CONsT. art. 9 5
(1954); CAL. Gov. CODE 26500; ORA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, 183 (1956). See, also, notes 14, 15, and 16 infra.
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classes of law violations. 0 For example, in some
states the prosecutor is required to investigate
such acts as arson," racial discrimination,'- or
gambling.3 However, the prosecuting attorney
frequently is not exclusively responsible for the
enforcement of these provisions. Legislatures, in
an effort to insure effective law enforcement have
often made several public officials expressly re-
sponsible for the same law.
1 4
Since the language of state constitutions and
statutes generally neither prohibit nor require in-
vestigation, it is important to analyze judicial
interpretations of these provisions in order to
ascertain what, if any, investigatory duty the
courts have imposed upon the prosecutor. Some
courts have interpreted statutes which require the
prosecuting attorney to prosecute as obliging him
to investigate all criminal acts even prior to the
ascertainment of a suspect. 5 Other courts have
refused to require the prosecutor to investigate
where the local police are charged with that duty. 6
These latter courts have -reasoned that the prose-
cuting attorney is a lawyer, not a detective, and
cannot be required to investigate generally unless
expressly advised to do so by statute. There is,
10 Some of the statutory provisions are collected
in DeLong & Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney, 24 J.
Cam. L. & C. 1025, 1050-55 (1935).
1 N.D. REv. CODE 18-0109 (1943).
12 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, 128 E (1951).
1ALA. CODE tit. 14, 274 (1940).
14 For example, in Alabama the sheriff, constable,
and prosecutor among other local officers are charged
with the enforcement of state gambling provisions.
ALA. CODE tit. 14 274 (1940).
1 In New Jersey, the prosecuting attorney is under
a "statutory duty to investigate suspicious situations"
and gather evidence especially when he receives in-
formation of a possible violation of the law. See State
v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 174, 96 A.2d 63, 74 (1933);
N.J. REv. STAT. C. 12A, 1584-5 (1952). In New York,
the prosecutor is "wholly responsible" for investigation
and prosecution of all crimes and offenses, if occurring
in his county. See People v. Dorsey, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 637,
644 (1941). In Kentucky, it is the duty of the prosecut-
ing attorney "to institute investigations, make inquiry
of his aids and assistants and make use of his detective
and investigator." See Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp.
930, 935 (E.D. Ky. 1947); KY. REv. STAT. 69.110
(1953).
16 In Mississippi, although the prosecuting attorney
is required to exercise diligence in prosecuting criminal
offenses, he need not undertake personally to discover
the circumstances of each offense. See Adams v. State,
202 Miss. 68, 74, 30 So.2d 593, 596 (1947); Miss.
CODE ANN. c. 6, tit. 17 (1942).
In Illinois, the prosecuting attorney "is not liable for
failures to perform any duty not expressly enjoined
upon him by statute", and the statutes do not require
him to investigate generally. See Schreiner v. Courtney,
380 Ill. 171, 175, 43 N.E.2d 982, 986 (1942); IrL. REv.
STAT. c. 14, §5 (1955).
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therefore, considerable conflict in the judicial in-
terpretations of these statutory provisions. At the
same time, however, it is clear that although some
courts indicate that the prosecutor cannot be
required to investigate generally, there has been
no judicial suggestion that he does not have the
authority to do so.
THE JUDICIAL-ExEcUTIvE DISTINCTION
In addition to the language and judicial inter-
pretations of state statutes, the prosecutor's duty
or power to investigate may depend upon whether
he is regarded as an officer of either the executive
or of the judicial branch of government. Some
states, by judicial interpretation of constitutions
or statutes, have classified the prosecutor as an
officer of the court. 7 As such, his primary duty is
to see that justice is rendered. 8 It has been argued
that if the prosecutor were to take a biased position
toward an individual prior to arrest or indictment,
his action would be inconsistent with his role of
an impartial judicial officer at the trial; and that
the prosecutor's investigative work will personally
involve him so deeply in the case that his prosecu-
tion might become vindictive in nature. However,
states which view the prosecuting attorney as an
executive officer regard him as obliged to take a
more active role in upholding the laws of the
state.' 9 Viewed thusly as an executive officer he
may be said to possess broader investigative power
than he would as a judicial officer. However, it is
unlikely that even those courts which classify the
prosecutor as a judicial officer would argue that he
should not vigorously prosecute at the trial.
Moreover, it is not likely that in cases where the
17 See, e.g., State v. Martin County, 214 Ind. 152,
14 N.E.2d 910 (1938) (Prosecutor was charged with the
administration of justice); State v. Wharfield, 41 Idaho,
14, 236 Pac. 862 (1925) (Prosecutor cannot perform
executive functions). In cases the prosecutor was con-
sidered a judicial officer of the government.
See, also, Snyder's case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 At. 33
(1930) (Prosecutor subject to supervision of judiciary);
People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 18 N.W. 362 (1884)(Prosecutor cannot investigate prior to arrest). In
these cases he was viewed as quasi-judicial by the
state courts.
"1The American Bar Association Committee on
Ethics appears to follow this view. Canon 5 declares
that the "primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice
is done." See, also, Daru, Code of Ethics and Principles
for the Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Cases, 6
ALA. LAW. 39 (1945).
9 See, e.g., State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A. 2d.
63 (1953), Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.Ky.
1947). In these cases the prosecutor was viewed as an
executive officer and given broader investigative
authority.
prosecutor does not investigate he will less vigor-
ously advocate the state's case.
Even if the judicial-executive distinction were
sound, there is evidence that this classification has
little practical effect upon the investigative ac-
tivities actually engaged in by the prosecutors. A
recent survey revealed that those prosecuting
attorneys who consider their office to be of a judi-
cial character nevertheless may engage in con-
siderable investigative work, while, conversely,
those who view their office as a branch of the
executive department may engage in little inves-
tigation.20 Thus, there is apparently little correla-
tion between the prosecutors' classification of their
office as executive or judicial and the investigative
procedure followed by various prosecuting attor-
neys.
THE PROSECUTOR AS A WITNESS
Apart from the judicial-executive distinction,
some courts have discouraged investigation by the
2"The Honorable John Gutknecht, former states
attorney of Cook County, Illinois, recently mailed a
questionnaire to one prosecutor's office in each of the
states; he received replies from thirty-six. Two of the
queries were: (1) Under which branch of government is
your office classified? (2) To what extent does your
office engage in investigatory work? The replies were
both interesting and surprising. Of fifteen prosecuting
attorneys who consider themselves to be judicial
officers, three do general police investigative work, one
does police work only in particular cases, eight in-
vestigate solely to keep a check on local law police
and one failed to indicate their investigative practice.
Seven of the prosecutors regard themselves as either
independent of both branches of government, or a
member of both. Two of these officers do general in-
vestigative work in all cases and two others make
police-type investigations of particular types of crime.
Three others investigate only as a means of policing
local law enforcers. It is interesting to note that at
least one prosecuting attorney who considers himself
to be a member of the executive branch of government
is classified as a quasi-judicial officer by the state
court. The District Attorney of King's County, New
York, feels that N.Y. CONST. art. 9 5 (1954), places
him under the executive branch of government. How-
ever, in McDonald v. Goldstein, 79 N.Y.S.2d 690,
693 (1948), the court held the prosecuting attorney
to be a quasi-judicial officer of the court. In King's
County, a special Investigating Bureau, which func-
tions on a twenty-four hour basis, every day of the
year, is attached to the prosecutor's office. In addition
to handling cases originating with the police, the in-
vestigation Bureau is called upon to investigate cases
originating in the office or complaints of citizens and
confidential investigations assigned by the district
attorney. Statistics indicate the success this bureau
has enjoyed in the King's County area. See DIST. ATTY.
or KING's COUNTY ANN. REP., at 94-97 (1955). For
other instances in which the prosecutor has employed
his investigative powers to combat organized crime, see
II OaGANZE CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 10-12,
230-41 (1952).
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